Two Aspects of Law and Theory*

RONALD J. ALLEN**

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, there was much ado about
law and theory, or the relationship between law and theory, or legal
theory, phrases that I take to be synonymous, two aspects of which I
want to discuss briefly today. With an introductory sentence like that,
the normal expectation would be that the next sentence would somehow
work in the phrase "about nothing," and, not wanting to be
unpredictable, thus casting doubt on somebody's behavioral theory, I
will fulfill this expectation by saying that a fair amount of the ado about
legal theory was indeed about nothing. I do not mean by that statement
that the discussions about and involving legal theory were not
wonderfully interesting, erudite, deep, insightful, and maybe even
significant at times. No, what I mean by saying that the arguments
about, and fascination with, legal theory were much ado about nothing is
that often it was literally about nothing: nothing corporeal, nothing real,
nothing tangible, nothing, in short, that would look to a physicist,
chemist, biologist, and probably not many sociologists or psychologists
either, as data over which a theory could be constructed. Frankly, as I
briefly discuss below, there was also generally nothing in these debates
that mattered to the operation of the legal system or that bore upon
significant questions of governance of the country.
The "data" that led, and still lead, to the most intense debates over
legal theory virtually never involve careful analysis of cases, for
example, or of legislative or administrative action, or of empirical work
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on the nature or foundations of government or legal regulation. The
most intense debates seem to be over ungrounded beliefs that are not
testable by any imaginable falsifying test. Even access to definitive and
authoritative cases would not suffice, for the case could always be
magisterially declared to have been in error. And legislation, of course,
doesn't even enter into questions of right or wrong in the modem
American law school.
Most, maybe all, of these contested beliefs are moral beliefs. One of
our panelists, Professor Fish, apparently believes that all moral beliefs
are ungrounded in this sense. Whether he believes other kinds of beliefs
are similarly ungrounded is not discussed in the paper prepared for
today. Another one of our panelists today, Professor Moore, believes
that moral beliefs are not ungrounded in the way that Professor Fish
asserts, and that they are in some sense real. I have already disclosed my
view of this debate, but the curious thing (and another manner in which
many serious debates within the set comprising legal theory are about
nothing at all) is that so far as I can tell not a single thing relevant to the

legal system or the governance of the nation turns on who is right and
who is wrong about the ontology of morality or ethics. Literally
nothing. This is not equivalent to asserting that nothing turns on the
perceived or known morality of some course of action, for a lot often
turns on that. Rather, nothing programmatic turns on whether we're all
caught within our own box from which there is no escape or whether
there are rivers of morality running past our windowsills. No one's
views on the morality of murder or the prima facie enforceability of
contracts will change based on the ontology of moral propositions. The
controversies over abortion and affirmative action will not be affected
one whit by the conclusion or discovery that true moral propositions
about the controversies may be uttered, or by the opposite conclusion
that moral propositions are purely subjective. The debate would
continue on its present course with at most a slight change in
vocabulary. If, for example, Professor Moore were to succeed in
convincing a skeptic, like me, that there are moral truths, and then
proceeded to try to dissuade me from some moral positions that I held,
surely I would respond that, no, it's you, Professor Moore, who is
mistaken about the details, although thank you very much for convincing
me that my moral positions are not just mine but are true as well.
Many of the theoretical debates over constitutional law bear a close
resemblance to direct academic moralizing, perhaps because lurking
behind many constitutional positions are moral positions. Whether that
is true or not, as you all know, arguments over constitutional law are
ubiquitous and never-ending. They never end, I have come to believe
(on the basis, I should note, of empiricism, seat-of-the-pants though it
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may be), for precisely the same reason that the debates over morality
never end-they are based largely on ungrounded beliefs, in Professor
Fish's sense, incapable of being falsified, and as I say, often (although
surely not always) these are moral beliefs. They are based, to recur to
my earlier phrase, although do remember its meaning, on nothing at all.
Here is part of my evidence for that proposition. At Northwestern, as I
am sure everywhere else, faculty workshops on constitutional law
dominate the scene. Many years ago, some of the participants in a
I
workshop were having a hotly contested, many-sided debate.
innocently (I swear it was innocent) raised my hand after about an hour
of listening to a discussion that so far as I could tell was going nowhere
and the point of which I could not discern, and asked: "What verifiable,
or if you prefer falsifiable, proposition can you all articulate that would
resolve this dispute among you?" There was silence. I was closely
examined by about four pairs of eyes as though I were a creature from
Mars, and then the disputants picked up exactly where they had left off.
My question has now become as ubiquitous at Northwestern as the
workshops on constitutional law, although no longer wholly innocently,
and I have yet to get a serious response to it. I infer from this, induction
though it may be, that verificationism, fallibilism, or any other attempt
to make sense of empirical knowledge, has not had much of an impact
on constitutional law scholarship.
Now, it seems to me that constitutional law and constitutional
scholarship are presented, at least implicitly, through the great emphasis
given to them in modem law schools, as paradigmatic of the nature of
law, or at least as occupying the highest rung on the status ladder. Add
to this mix wrangling over moral issues, and together you have what
occupies a fair amount of the time and attention of both students and
faculty. This aspect of legal theory has two detrimental consequences.
First, constitutional law and moral debate are not paradigmatic of law or
government, and we do a disservice to our students by implying to the
contrary. We live in a web of regulation constantly emanating from
legislatures and administrative agencies of various kinds that affects
virtually every action we take. Almost none of this web is subject to
serious constitutional challenge or amenable to deep philosophical
discourse, yet it is the creation and sustenance of the web of regulation
that is paradigmatic of, indeed in large measure just constitutes, the legal

and governance systems. The primary professional tasks of virtually
every one of our graduates will be to assist in the maintenance of the
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web and in their clients' navigation of it. Moreover, it is how well these
tasks are performed that will determine in large measure the quality of
life that people live, not the never-ending debates over what passes for
constitutional or moral theory, as fun and interesting as they are.
By saying this, I do not diminish the very strong feelings that lie
behind positions on matters like abortion and affirmative action. Indeed,
it is important for a novice lawyer to gain an understanding of the deep
commitments and, it must be said, anger and irrationality that are at play.
But the task of the legal system, the task of lawyers, is to deal with these
deep commitments, anger, and irrationality, not to add fuel to the fire by
implicitly suggesting to law students that adding another forum for
unfalsifiable rhetoric, especially heated unfalsifiable rhetoric, somehow
is an adequate response to these deep social conflicts. The appropriate
response to such matters (and yes, I admit it, there is a moral theory
creeping in here, as much as I try to keep it at bay) from the law schools,
it seems to me, is to treat such matters as exemplars of the pathological
problems that affect any legal system that deserve study for just that
reason: they are serious pathological problems that need to be
accommodated to preserve the civil peace. They are thus marvelous
exemplars of dispute resolution, generally conceived, and its difficulties,
but I daresay that is not how they are treated in legal pedagogy or
scholarship, to the diminishment of both.
One last point on this first aspect of legal theory: I do not argue that
the rhetoric of modem moral and constitutional debates has no place in
the law schools, save as examples of social pathology, a position at least
somewhat related to Judge Posner's recent attack on academic
moralizing.' Although I think Judge Posner's attack largely hits the
target, he may neglect somewhat the distinction between fully formed
adults and the young, and for the most part law students are in the latter
category. It is a useful exercise for the young to check their moral
intuitions against the more fully formulated positions of others, as does

occur effectively in the law schools, I think. In addition, certainly an
understanding of the burning moral issues of the times, and some guided
self-reflection on one's own relevant moral intuitions, is well within the
purview of institutions of higher education, including law schools.
Rather, my concern is the deleterious consequences of the inversion of
this subsidiary aspect of legal education and scholarship into its primary
exemplar.
The second aspect of legal theory is at least tangentially related to the
first, and it has to do with whether legal theorists accurately model the
1. See Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111
HARV. L. REv. 1637 (1998).
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object of their inquiry. Judge Posner excoriates academic moralists for,
among other reasons, being ineffectual in bringing about changes of
view, and more particularly legal consequences. He is absolutely right

about this, but his argument has a much wider domain. It applies to a
wide swath of legal theory, although how widely I'm not yet in a
position to assert confidently. In a recent article, Scott Brewer has

captured what I suspect is the generally held view of the relationship
between theory and practice in the United States:
In this area of law, as in many others, there is an intellectual division of
labor between "high theory" workers and the appliers and administrators of
theory-motivated doctrines. The paradigm for this division of labor is the
common law itself. In that system, some judges, scholars, and lawyers take the
lead in organizing, systematizing, analyzing, rationalizing, and revising
doctrines and the theories that motivate them (e.g., theories of justice and equity
in contract, tort, constitutional, and property law; theories of mind and
motivation in the criminal law; economic theories throughout public and private
law). These are the Holmeses, the Cardozos, the Brandeises, the Learned
Hands, the Posners, and the Corbins, as well as innumerable scholars. These
jurists organize and reorganize whole lines of cases, propose values to explain
and criticize and motivate changes in common law doctrines. These "high
theory" jurists can indeed quite plausibly be seen as making thick theoretical
commitments to metaphysical and epistemological theories of the sort seen in
probabilistic accounts of factfinding judgments. But of course not all jurists,
and certainly not all judges, make or even attempt to make deep theoretical
commitments of this sort. Many defer epistemologically to their high-theory
brethren, administeringdoctrines articulated by the high theorists, but without
engaging in sophisticated high theory themselves. These judges tend only to
administer the doctrines that high theorists create for the law's epistemology.
They tend to make only the incremental changes that are inevitable in the face
of gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities that attend any system of laws. Quite often
they deploy the resources of analogy to make these incremental changes, not
least in using analogy-warranting rationalesdeveloped by high-theory judges.
And as it is in the common law, so it is in the amalgam of common law,
administration that comprises the official rules of legal
legislation, and
2
epistemology.

Professor Brewer has covered a lot of ground in this passage, but I

only want to focus on a small part of it, in particular the implications of
what he refers to as "high theory." I think his picture of the high
theorists clearing the ground that is later sown and reaped by others is

conventional, but I'm not sure it is accurate if it means to refer to the
relationship between the high theorists of law and law itself, however
accurate of relationships within legal scholarship it may be. As a minor
2.
YALE L.J.

Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107
1535, 1649-50 (1998).

part of some work I am now doing, I have begun looking at the

relationship between citations of legal scholarship in law reviews and
citations in cases and legislative hearings. There is virtually no
relationship between the two. The high priests of theory who get

thousands of citations in the legal literature, including perhaps the two
giants of modem American legal theory, Posner and Dworkin, get

virtually no citations in cases or legislative reports (excluding Posner's

judicial opinions, of course). As Ross Rosenberg and I have done the
search, Posner's academic work has gotten close to 9,000 citations in

law reviews, but only 628 in cases. Dworkin has gotten by our count
close to 4,000 citations in law reviews, and a grand total of 87 in the
cases. Cass Sunstein has gotten approximately 5,000 citations in law
reviews, but only 227 in cases. Both Catherine MacKinnon and Jack

Balkin have been cited in law reviews close to 1,000 times, but get only
scattered cites in cases (MacKinnon 12 and Balkin 3). Indeed, do you
know what is the single most cited authority for an argument that we
have been able to identify?

It is common sense, invoked as an

argument.4 And its only close competitors that we have been able to

identify are the Wright and Miller treatise5 and maybe Moore's Federal
Practice6 (we're not sure yet). The words and phrases "common sense,"
"commonsensical," and "sensible," used as an argument (based on crude
sampling), appear upwards of 70,000 times in Westlaw. Wright and
Miller is cited about 35,000 times. Wigmore is next with about 22,000
cites, and then things fall like a rock. Corbin' gets about 1,000, and

almost no non-treatise writer gets more than 100.

This is not because

law reviews aren't cited. Cases cite law reviews over 350,000 times.

They just don't cite what passes for high theory very much.9 Perhaps the

3. We continue to refine our analysis. I will provide our methodology to anyone
who requests it.
4. Surely precedent would topple even common sense. We just could not come
up with a method of getting a count of case citations as authority. "Common sense?' is
also involved frequently without being referred to in such terms, thus maling our count
much too low. For example, in Balderos v. City Chevrolet,214 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2000),
Judge Posner disposed of one legal contention by saying: "If there were such a
relationship it would mean that the buyer could tell the dealer to shop the retail sales
contract among finance companies and to disclose the various offers the dealer obtained
to him, and no one dealing with an automobile dealer expects that kind of service." Id. at

854.

5. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHuR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1987).
6. JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (3d ed. 1997).
7. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW (3d ed. 1940).
8.

ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1993).

9. See Deborah Jones Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do
Courts and Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 Cmu. KENT L.
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zenith, or nadir depending upon your point of view, was the recent cases
of Vacco v. Quill' and Washington v. Glucksberg," in which the Court
held that state bans on assisted suicide do not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. The cream of the American philosophical crop'2 wrote an
amicus brief to the contrary, which the Court did not even mention in
reaching its unanimously opposite conclusion. By the way, I'm not sure
how unique the law is in its relationship to common sense. I did a
survey of books listed in the philosophical index with the term "common
sense" in the title, and got 257 titles.13
These data are hardly dispositive; perhaps they are even a bit silly,
although I must say they are much more dramatic than I had predicted.
Still, some might claim that the high theorists do their work, which then
filters down the pyramid where it is finally absorbed at even the
bottommost level. For example, in a recent Seventh Circuit opinion,
Judge Posner asserted, consistently with the tenets of the law and

economics movement, that the cost/benefit formula of Learned Hand "is
used to determine negligence in a tort case."' 4 We're still searching, but
we have not found a single instruction that is even remotely analogous to
such a charge within the traditional field of torts. There are plenty of
definitions of negligence, and plenty of instructions on discrete torts, but
not one of them refers to the Hand formula or any of its derivatives of
which we are aware. 5 If the legal economists had captured a major truth
about the nature of tort litigation, one would expect that truth over time
to be reflected in the system itself, which has not occurred. One test of
this prediction is the field of antitrust, which has also been given, as I
understand it, a microeconomic justification, but in which our
preliminary work indicates jury instructions are rife with economic
concepts.
REV. 871 (1996).
10. See 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
11. See 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
12. Ronald Dworkin, Peter L. Zimroth, Peter H. Curtis, Kent A. Yalawitz, Anand
Agneschwar, and Abe Krash.
13. However, philosophical work gets short shrift by the courts, as well, at least as
judged by its reception by the Supreme Court. According to Neomi Rao, philosophers
have been cited a total of 49 times in the entire history of the Supreme Court. See Neomi
Rao, A Backdoor to Policy Making: The Use of Philosophersby the Supreme Court, 65
U. Cm. L. REv. 1371, 1375 (1998).
14. Navarro v. Fuji Heavy Indus., Ltd., 117 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 1997).

15. Whether courts, appellate or trial, review jury verdicts from the Hand formula

perspective is a different matter. See, e.g., Bammerlin v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 30
F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 1994).

Our (Rosenberg's and my) explanation of such data is that in many
instances the high legal theorists have mismodeled the phenomenon they
are supposedly explicating, and many less-high legal theorists have
followed in these mistaken footsteps. They have modeled the law as an
integrated formal system or process amenable to top-down theorizing,
and much of the law's domain is not-an argument, as some of you
know, as Ross Rosenberg and I have developed in detail in the Fourth
Amendment context." It is a bottom-up, organic process at the heart of
which is the deployment of common sense in order to muddle through
the complexities of the human condition. Thus, I suspect it is not that
the high theory is too obscure for the legal practitioners to understand
that explains the short shrift given it in the real legal world; rather, it is
that those very astute but commonsensical practitioners realize its
irrelevancy-as do the judges that decline to cite it.
Again, I hope to be corrected if I am wrong, but much legal theory
employs rather simple logical tools of deduction to do its work, and
more importantly rests upon the unstated belief that such tools exhaust
the possibilities. An area of law is said to be "conceptualized" when its
basic assumptions are identified, and some logical consequences of those
assumptions are derived. It is "reconceptualized," a sin I must confess
that I have engaged in myself, when different assumptions are
articulated, with sometimes differing implications. What goes neglected
is the question whether a particular phenomenon is amenable to such
analysis, and much of the universe is not, or at least is not yet, and my
guess is never will be throughout the duration of the human race. Much
of what goes on in the universe is a matter of adjustment to disturbances
not easily, and maybe not at all, reducible to deductive logical forms.
When gas is added to a container, all the other molecules react to the
change, but typically in much too complex a fashion to ever be reduced
to simple equations or deductions.
To be sure, lawlike behavior is at play in the motion of gases, but any
actual observation will not be specifically describable in those terms.
This is the standard problem of computational complexity, but the
standard legal problem is more complicated still, for it involves not just
physical laws but intent, motivation, knowledge-all the attributes of
cognition. I cheerily admit that it must be the case (in other words, I
believe it is the case) that all aspects of cognition are reducible to
chemistry and physics, but this affects things again not a whit. Even if
my admission is correct, that it is chemistry and physics all the way
16. Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The FourthAmendment and the Limits
of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1149,
1149-1201 (1998).
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down, cognition is still too complicated to be computed using standard
top-down deductive models. More importantly, and more deeply, even
an irrefutable scientific demonstration that the material reductionists are
right about mental states will matter hardly at all to how we organize
ourselves, for it provides no useful organizing schemata that allow us to
get along in life. Useful organizing schemata must, as they do, respond
to the cognitive messiness in all brains, even the most clear, which I
believe takes us back to a constant series of adjustments and away from
top-down organizing theories.
"So what?" seems the appropriate question at this point. The answer
is that most human interactions can best be understood as a process of ad
hoc adjustment rather than an implication of, or understandable as, topdown deductive structures. I assert that this goes for much of the law's
domain. To analyze many legal fields using the standard legal theory
tools of theory, or assumption articulation and logical deduction, often
grossly mismodels the phenomenon, and in part leads to the irrelevancy
of the theorizing, an argument that Rosenberg and I are now in the
process of making.

To many of you this may sound like an argument for irrationality, for
if we give up top-down deductive structures, what is left? Indeed, this
impulse is so strong that even writers like Cass Sunstein who seem to
edge close to the point I am making here eventually back off and refer to
such matters as "incompletely theorized agreement," 7 or some such
term, as though phenomena could only be completely analyzed in
standard, top-down ways, or that even matters such as analogies must
ultimately be understood as defective deductions. This is not true,
however, or at least it is not true that no other useful, and more useful,
tools exist, regardless of the final ontological status of any object or
phenomenon under examination. Examples are connectionist, or parallel
distributed processing, networks in artificial intelligence research that
are used to model neural networks. Indeed, as my next-to-last point here
today, I want to suggest that many fields of law, especially those still
heavily influenced by common law methodologies, may be modeled as
neural networks responding to disturbances until equilibria are reached,
a modeling that may capture many salient features of legal reality better
than present conventional models.
17. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARv. L. REv.
1733, 1741 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REv. 741

(1993).

Now my last point: There is a lot that remains to be said about
virtually every point I have made, but time is up. A few examples,
though. I referred earlier to common sense. I have in mind something
quite definite, and definitely not just the conventional notion of a set of
propositions. If anyone is interested, we can discuss it later. Another
example. It is perfectly understandable why the tools of logical
deduction are the tools of choice of the legal theorist, and nothing said
here today is intended to disparage logic. There are deeper currents
running here as well that deserve further explication. The phrase "legal
theory" is often used as though its meaning were clear, and I so
proceeded today. However, in fact, what it is supposed to mean isn't
clear to me. In science, the normal relationships are between theories
that may entail experimental laws, among other things, that in turn
explain observables. Even the sophisticated treatments of legal theory
such as Professor Moore's leave out the intermediate step of
experimental laws. This leaves ambiguous both the phrases extension
and intension, at least to me. And so on. Each of the points made here
requires elaboration, but I fear I have run out of time.

